I. Introduction
In the modern globalized system, transnational corporations ("TNCs") have been rising in economic, social, and political importance. 1 Recently, there has been a growing body of evidence that the impact of TNCs' activities in developing countries can result in violations of human rights or act as a catalyst for violation of human rights. 2 E.g., TNCs' doing business in the developing world were not only involved in various conflicts, but were in fact the engine of the conflicts. 3 Many TNCs have been accused of violating their workers' rights to just and favorable working conditions such as suppressing trade unions, denying workers' right to organize, and causing environmental disasters. Human rights abuses by foreign corporations are well documented. As Dumberry and Dumas-Aubin succinctly summarized, TNCs have been accused of violating the right to enjoy life, to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, to freedom from slavery and arbitrary imprisonment, and many other human rights. Deriving from respect for human dignity, human rights of individuals are usually defined as a normative embodiment of the most important universal values of human beings, applicable in every human community. Even though the exact definition of what constitutes fundamental human right is difficult to define and variations occur in the literature, minimum fundamental human rights, which corporations are required to observe, has been catalogued into three groups by certain scholars. These include fundamental human rights preserving the security of persons, labor rights, and non-discrimination. 
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6 Persons impacted by the human rights violations can be categorized into the following three groups as workers, communities, and end-users. 7 Human rights protections traditionally focus and impose duties solely upon States. 8 This singular focus has led to a breakdown in the protection of international human rights in recent decades. The systemic separation between international economic development, human rights enforcement, and the regulation of private players leaves power to commit human rights abuses in the hands of non-State actors ("NSAs"). 9 The rapid expansion of transnational economic activity and the corresponding growth in the power of TNCs has prompted international discourse and action to address the human rights violations committed by TNCs.
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The goal of this research is to explain why and how BITs could be drafted or amended in order to enhance TNCs' human rights accountability. This paper is composed of six parts including Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will analyze the rationales for holding TNCs liable for human rights violations. Part three will take stock of existing legal institutions regulating TNCs. Part four will examine the difficulties and hurdles in subjecting TNCs to human rights liability. Part five will probe into potential advisable proposals on how BITs should be reformed, both in substance and procedure, to better respect human rights.
II. Why Should TNCs be Held Liable for Human Rights Violations?
Before getting into how to hold TNCs liable for human rights violations, it is imperative to first ascertain why TNCs should be accountable. 
A. The Need to Rebalance State Power to Regulate TNCs in the Public Interest
In connection with the increased discussions on whether, and to what extent, TNCs should be required to observe fundamental human rights standards, growing concern in this area may be attributed to a few factors. One is the increased unease at the seemingly unaccountable operations of private capital in a globalizing economy. 11 Accordingly, host States' power to regulate TNCs in the public interest has to some extent been obstructed due to jurisdictional limits and lack of investors' responsibilities. 12 Out of the need to rebalance the sovereignty of State to regulate TNCs' economic activities and their interest in investment, it is important to hold TNCs accountable for human rights violation. 13 Indeed, a continued imbalance may dissuade States from promoting foreign investments.
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B. Need for Compatibility between TNC Power and Accountability
There should be sufficient reciprocity between the rights one enjoys and the corresponding obligations one holds. 15 There is significant consensus that TNCs wield an extraordinary amount of financial and political power, which should be matched with a corresponding degree of responsibility and accountability.
C. TNCs Have Competency and Can be Incentivized to Protect Human Rights
Responsibility positively correlates to competency. There is a growing consensus that subjecting TNCs to the same mandatory standards of international law as those to which States are subjected would benefit both the global community and individual TNCs. 17 As a matter of fact, some evidence suggests that TNCs can have spillover effects on local communities. 18 One way to address these effects is for TNCs to internalize their externalities in the area of human rights violations. 19 By respecting human rights, TNCs can send a signal to the world that they are in compliance with international law 20 and can indeed improve human rights conditions. 21 By observing fundamental human rights, TNCs' reputations benefit, which can help the TNCs avoid negative publicity and the resulting loss of profit and stock value. 33 As progressive as these instruments appear, commentators consistently argue that the documents do not impose direct duties or obligations upon the TNC, but instead focus on 'soft' obligations.
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III. Existing Legal Institutions Regulating TNCs
34
In addition, in May 2011, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises ("SRSG"), John Ruggie, submitted to the UN Human Rights Council the "Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights," aimed at implementing the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" policy framework. 35 The Council unanimously adopted the Guiding Principles at its June 2011 session. According to Ruggie, the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" framework under the Guiding Principles aims to provide a coherent approach to addressing governance gaps and overcoming the problems of individual action by States and corporate actors. 36 The framework also provides a means by which to develop the normative content of corporate responsibility for human rights. The framework focuses on three pillars: (1) further development of the State duty to protect under international human rights law; (2) clarification of the moral responsibility of corporate actors to respect human rights; and (3) development of remedies for victims of corporate human rights violations. 37 Additionally, national legal systems have recognized corporate human rights obligations through reporting requirements and divestment initiatives targeting alleged violators. 38 A notable example is the Norway's sovereign wealth fund, which is proactive in weeding out corporate bad actors and even entire industries from its investment portfolio.
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B. Hard Laws
Generally, in addition to explicit and implied recognition of private human rights in various human rights instruments, those duties are recognized by various UN entities including the Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, and tribunals in several other countries. 40
International Treaties and Instruments
As noted above, most treaties only indirectly regulate corporations, as States are the treaties' primary targets. States are then required to translate such international legal obligations into national legislation.
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In the international forum, violations of human rights recognized in particular treaties and customary international law often reach private perpetrators expressly or by implication. E.g., the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that the human rights proclaimed therein are "a common standard of achievement of all peoples … [including] every individual and every organ of society."
42 Article 29, paragraph 1, affirms that: "Everyone has duties to the community …," 43 Article 30 recognizes that no right of "any … group or person …
[exists] to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth" in the Universal Declaration.
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The preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") affirms that "the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant." 45 Article 5 of ICCPR also recognizes the lack of right of "any … group or person … to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth." Private duties have also been openly recognized in the preamble to Articles 27 through 29 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 48 The preamble to the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man acknowledges that "the fulfillment of duty by each individual is a pre-requisite to the rights of all. Rights and duties are interrelated …" In addition, Articles XXIX through XXXVIII of the Declaration set forth several express duties of private actors. 49 The authoritative Human Rights Committee created under ICCPR has also recognized that States should report "the provisions of their criminal law which penalize torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment whether committed by public officials or other persons acting on behalf of the State, or by private persons. Those who violate Article 7, whether by encouraging, ordering, toleration or perpetuating prohibited acts, must be held responsible." 50 The
Human Rights Committee added that States have a duty to afford protection against such acts "whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity" 51 and "States must not deprive individuals of right to an effective remedy." 52
Home State Laws
As the underwriters of the cornerstone human rights treaties, States assume principal responsibility for the realization of human rights. 53 Consequently, human rights law largely relies upon the implementation by domestic legislatures and courts, while the regulations of corporations remain the major province of States.
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In the domestic forum, some domestic laws provide a forum for claims against foreign corporations, such as the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"). ATCA allows Nevertheless, Katuoka and Dailidaite think that litigation under ATCA is the most effective way to hold TNCs accountable for human rights violations. 64 They maintain that ATCA has a low jurisdictional threshold based on the minimum contact requirement, an extraterritorial nature, and offers choice of law, namely, the law of the US. Furthermore, claims under ATCA can rest on an international legal norm as long as the norm is specific, universal and obligatory. 
Host State Laws
Without direct regulation at the international level, save for soft-law provisions which are often industry-made and lack the coercive bite of judicial enforcement, 'responsibility' has fallen to host States to provide domestic redress. 66 Certain laws and regulations in the host State thus directly relate to TNCs' human rights accountability. Host States' labor laws, corporate laws, and environmental protection laws may have provisions that can constitute the legal basis for holding TNCs accountable for violating human rights. 67 There are also cases where courts in host States found corporations liable for negligence or other grounds. Among the host States, however, certain developing countries might not be fully incentivized to enforce human rights protections. Indeed, there can be a "race to the bottom" where host States compete with each other to lower their requirements on human rights compliance in order to attract more foreign investment. 68 E.g., Ho argues that some dimensions of corporate law in fact extend across the formal internal legal boundaries of the multinational corporation. 69 Furthermore, although corporate law cannot directly remedy human rights violations, this area of law is critical to enforcing human rights obligations on corporations 70 In addition, certain commentators propose cooperation between home and host countries in order to provide greater access to judicial remedy for victims of TNCs human rights violations. The proposals presented the possibility for this cooperation to materialize through bilateral investment treaties ("BITs").
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IV. Difficulties and Hurdles in Subjecting TNCs to Human Rights Liability
Even though there is consensus that TNCs should be accountable for human rights violations, there are both procedural and substantive challenges at different levels to realizing such a goal.
A. Lack of Legal Basis for Holding TNCs Liable at the International Level
Even though States are no longer the exclusive subject of international rights and duties, NSAs are still considered mere objects of international law. 72 This has become a significant hurdle to achieving effective human rights protection. The traditional view that under human rights law individuals hold the rights while only States bear the obligations has been incrementally criticized for its inability to fully ensure the human right of individuals. 73 
B. Lack of Incentive or Competency of Host Government and Home Government
Because of the significant economic power of TNCs and certain host States' thirst for and reliance on foreign investment, many developing country's governments are not keen on enforcing human rights laws. They are often concerned that strict enforcement might discourage TNCs investment, critical to local economic development. Moreover, some host governments even become complicit in the human rights violation by TNCs. 80 In addition, even though some host governments have the determination to enhance human rights protection and punish the TNCs for their human rights violation, the governments would not have sufficient resources to effectively realize the goal in a meaningful way. 81 In terms of home State, generally, there is almost no obligation under international law to punish investors for breaching human rights law in a foreign jurisdiction. 82 As a result, there are not enough regulations in home States to allow them to effectively monitor their investors' human rights compliance and sanction them when there are violations.
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C. Race to the Bottom
Today, consensus is needed on uniform global standards that apply to all TNCs operations irrespective of geographical, cultural or national background. Otherwise, a "race to the bottom" will occur, characterized by the progressive movement of capital and technology from countries with relatively high levels of human rights protections to countries with relatively low levels. 84 TNCs will be incentivized to transfer their business to those jurisdictions with lower protection of human rights to take advantage of reduced compliance costs. This problem is particularly thorny in a global society where many domestic tools (such as fiscal control) 85 will not work effectively due to the lack of central authority. Therefore, the global community needs a mechanism to ensure that countries are not forced to compete for investment by lowering human rights standards and tolerating bad TNC behavior.
D. Lack of International Organizations with Sufficient Competency
The regional human rights bodies, and even more so the UN human rights bodies, have regularly been criticized for being ineffective and excessively political. 86 Problems faced by human rights bodies stem from not only an ambiguous attitude towards contentious political issues, but also a lack of adequate financial and human resources. 87 Moreover, even though suggestions have been made to adopt codes of conduct under the auspices of international organizations, enforcement questions remain.
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E. Other Disincentives and Technical Barriers
Developing countries often lack the economic incentives to voluntarily respect citizens' human rights, especially in the areas of labor and environment which require protecting the physical and mental health of individuals. 89 Even when it becomes clear that TNCs are in derogation of local laws and regulations, an existential imbalance of power generally precludes enforcement. 90 The ability to successfully prosecute the corporation is problematic in two respects. First, developing countries need the TNC to foster the employment that their economies desperately need. Naturally, developing countries might lack the incentive to prosecute the TNCs. 91 
V. A Potential Response from Bilateral Investment Treaties -A Balanced Approach -
To improve the régime regulating TNCs in the area of human rights, concerted efforts and a diversified governance model are needed. There are already creative ideas that have emerged in the scholarly discussions. E.g., David Kinley, Adam McBeth and others have explored the question of whether or not international law does or should impose human rights obligations on the entities of the World Bank Group. 93 Nevertheless, no single body can provide a comprehensive enforcement mechanism. Rather, the collective efforts of all institutions should be made across their constituent fields, with each contributing their particular expertise and resources.
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The major form of TNCs' economic activities is 'investment,' and the main body of international investment law is a web of BITs, agreements for promoting foreign investment in a specific country. When the interests of foreign investors can sometimes collide with the human rights of those living in the host State, the host State should be able to justify the measures based on its human rights obligations in order not to avoid liability for breaching its obligations under BITs. 95 There is significant consensus on the need for a greater degree of balance in BITs between the legitimate interests of investors and host countries. 96 As certain scholars pointed out, BITs are extremely narrow in their formulation by according substantive rights to investors; they do not correspond duties or obligation on the part of those investors. 97 Foreign investments have the potential to work as a catalyst for the individual's human rights. However, TNC investors are often not explicitly obliged under investment agreements to observe human rights even though they exert considerable power over individuals and communities. 98 An innovative idea is to incorporate human rights obligations into BITs, 99 as this would be an efficient way to impose obligations directly upon corporations via international law. International investment agreements contain a social dimension, as foreign investment directly impacts social, political and environmental issues. Consequently, international investment law should be re-conceptualized in order to realize both the economic and social aspects of foreign investment. 100 Indeed, given the increasing and widespread use of BITs and their effective dispute settlement mechanisms, it may be possible for States to revamp the present BIT regime to better accommodate public interest and human rights. States could accomplish this goal by either amending existing BITs, negotiating new BITs, or interpreting certain BIT provisions with binding force. In addition, human rights obligations, as well as treaty-based compliance mechanisms, could be introduced into BITs and other international investment agreements. 101 E.g., SRSG urges States which are in the process of, or considering, reviewing their policy with respect to these agreements "to ensure that the new model BITs combine robust investor protection with adequate allowances for bona fide public interest measures, including human rights, applied in a nondiscriminatory manner." 102 Indeed, some of the BITs already encompass certain provisions aiming to address investors' violation of human rights. 103 Accordingly, the proposed changes can be categorized as changes either in procedure or in substance.
In this reform, one has to balance the investor's need to protect financial interests and the host State's need to regulate. A balancing test could be adopted as shown at As Table 1 illustrates, no matter in the situation of signing a BIT, or a tribunal is entertaining a case, or a host government is contemplating a potential legislation, each needs to balance two bundles of factors. On one hand, the degree of investor harm should be ascertained, particularly in relation to the significance of affected interests of the investors (whether fundamental, significant, or insignificant on the spectrum) and the magnitude of intrusion (whether total, significant or insignificant on the spectrum). 105 On the other hand, the host government's justification should be ascertained, particularly in relation to the significance of the government interest in protecting human rights (whether it is compelling, significant or insignificant on the spectrum), and how 'necessary' the government action is following a means-ends analysis (whether the governmental action is necessary, significant or insignificant in the spectrum). This balancing test should be taken into consideration in any of the situations mentioned above.
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Instead of ambitiously exhausting all the changes that international investment law shall make, this part tries to pinpoint the key changes that should be made which are reasonably feasible in reality. In any event, it would be natural for certain States to feel nervous about these provisions in their BITs, either because it would make foreign direct investment less attractive and have a chilling effect on the potential investors, or because it might affect the State's competitive position on international markets. Thus, it is important to reconsider the idea of a multilateral agreement on investment, which would ensure implementation by all the members in the same way.
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A. How should BITs be Drafted (and Existing Ones be Amended)?
Keeping the aforementioned balancing test in mind, here are a few areas that need to be reformed or amended. Of course, whether these changes can be put into the BITs in practice is another question. It actually depends on the negotiation leverage of the parties.
Scope of Agreement
One important modification to many formulations commonly encountered at present would be to provide that an investment for the purposes of the agreement is only one concluded in accordance with the host State's domestic law governing the investment and international human rights law.
108 Indeed, tribunals have been recognizing this requirement in certain arbitration awards. In Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, e.g., the tribunal expressed the view that protection "should not be granted to investments made in violation of the most fundamental rules of protection of human rights, like investments made in pursuance of torture or genocide or in support of slavery or trafficking of human organs." 
Expropriation Provisions
A wide variety of government measures might constitute expropriation. Even though a host State has the right to expropriate a foreign investor's investments, such right is limited by the requirements in the expropriation provision of the treaties (such as the expropriation must be for a non-discriminatory public purpose, and the obligation to compensate the investor). 110 It is apparent that expropriation provisions might make it more burdensome for States to regulate for human rights reasons.
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E.g., it is imaginable that if a host State's new policy that requires enhanced working conditions of employees might constitute indirect expropriation having negative economic impact on the investors, compensation is thus required. Furthermore, BITs could specify exactly when non-discriminatory regulatory actions designed and applied to protect human rights and legitimate public welfare objectives such as public health and safety, do not constitute indirect expropriations.
112
A good prototype is the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa ("COMESA") investment agreement, which contains an express carve out provision, stating:
Consistent with the right of states to regulate and the customary international law principles on police powers, bona fide regulatory measures taken by a Member State that are designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, shall not constitute an indirect expropriation under this Article. 113 
Fair and Equitable Treatment
These days, the majority of BITs include the "fair and equitable treatment" standard ("FET"). It is one of the most important principles of international investment law. FET has become the most prominent and controversial standard in this area of law, often leading to divergent approaches by tribunals. 114 Various types of governmental actions that inherently deter investments might run afoul of FET. These governmental actions might be motivated by human rights concerns (such as public safety and labor rights). 115 A carve out should be made to exempt State regulations aiming to protect human rights, which otherwise would violate FET provisions.
In drafting the BIT, a clause could stipulate something to the effect that differential treatment on the basis of public welfare considerations, such as public health, safety, or the environment, does not contravene this standard. As a matter of fact, there is already a consensus that the investor's legitimate expectations must be balanced against the host State's legitimate right to regulate domestic matters in the public interest. 116 Moreover, investors should assume certain duties (such as the observance of domestic laws in the host State, the cooperation with the host government, or the due diligence for the investment environment in the host State) in order to enjoy the protection offered by FET. 
Exception provision
A progressive BIT could lay down a clear exception to a national treatment violation for limited cases of affirmative action, i.e., programs designed to promote equality and advance those segments of society that have been historically disadvantaged or unfairly discriminated against. 118 Nonetheless, the issue of public purpose justifications for State regulation looms large, so that once again clear and uniform jurisprudence may have yet to emerge to guide policymakers on this point. The proper balance between investor protection and the State's right to regulate remains similarly elusive with respect to these clauses. 119 One could draft a general exception clause that seeks to preserve States' right to regulate in vital areas, thus recognizing that a commitment to human rights and related interests frequently requires more than mere omissions. 120 
Requirement of Pre-Establishment Social Impact Assessment
Some scholars suggest that a BIT should include an investor obligation for environmental and social impact assessment. 121 As a matter of fact, the IISD Model
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development has an entire section stipulating the obligations and duties of investors and investments.
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B. Reform of Procedure for Dispute Settlement
Investment law and arbitration law have recently gained much attention due to the perception that large-scale foreign investment occasionally cuts across other essential interests such as human rights protection. 123 Eventually, reform of the dispute settlement procedure should be conducted so that it can accommodate claims of investors' violation of human rights and thus hold investors accountable. 124 
Clean-hands doctrine
There is some consensus that the 'clean hands' doctrine should be introduced into international investment to empower BITs not only to bring justice to investors, but also to bring investors to justice. 125 Under the doctrine of 'clean hands,' an injured party's wrongdoing may limit his/her claim to reparations. 126 The doctrine has been applied in various contexts in the domestic laws. 127 International tribunals generally found inadmissible claims of claimants that had engaged in wrongful conduct in relation to their claims. 128 An investor's protection under a BIT could be conditioned upon its respect for human rights. Such a 'clean hands' doctrine could be introduced into bilateral investment treaties. 129 In other words, requiring an investment to be made in accordance with human rights would preclude claims by an investor with unclean hands (in violation of human rights). As Moloo has observed, even though the historical application of the 'clean hands' doctrine has been inconsistent, recent decisions in the investment arbitration context suggest that the doctrine has a place in international law. 130 Patrick and Dumas-Aubin maintained that even in the absence of an "in accordance with the law" provision in a BIT, there would exist an implicit obligation for investors to make investments in accordance with the host State's laws. 131 In practice, the doctrine of 'clean hands' should entitle tribunals to find inadmissible any claims involving human rights violations. 132 Another variation is the "offsetting of damages" option. 133 Tribunals could permit an investor's claim even in the face of human rights violations, but to allow the respondent State to raise any such allegations during the arbitral proceedings. Nevertheless, the trigger of the 'clean hands' doctrine needs to be ascertained in each case so that it will become an area of dispute. In addition to violations of jus cogens, 134 what other human rights violation might trigger 'clean hands' need to be clarified.
Counterclaim
A claimant investor would be permitted to file a claim even in the face of human rights violations. The host country should be allowed to raise human rights allegations in a counterclaim. 135 However, there are two significant procedural hurdles in establishing the jurisdiction for counterclaims. Second is the 'connection' requirement between the counterclaim and the primary claim to which it is a response. It is another important condition for the tribunal to have jurisdiction over a counterclaim. Each tribunal must decide upon the scope of the interpretation of the term 'connection' 141 in the view of particular circumstances of an individual case, including facts, relevant treaties, and other texts. 142 In conclusion, drafting treaties to permit closely related counterclaims would help to rebalance investment law by enabling the host State to launch a counterclaim. 143 adopt a more constructive approach by looking within the regime itself to see how their tools can be used to promote human rights, regardless of the semantics used. He demonstrates that by relying on guiding principles (the legitimate expectations and distinct-investment-backed expectations), a nondiscriminatory State measure pursuing a human rights objective will rarely be viewed as violating the FET treatment provision or as constituting indirect expropriation. 146 Moreover, Choudhury proposes certain interpretation approaches in ascertaining the exception provisions that allow States to derogate from their international investment agreement obligations under specified condition. 147 These exception provisions are broad enough to encapsulate human rights obligations in their ambit.
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D. Incentivize the States and Tribunals
Some capital-exporting countries might be reluctant to make the aforementioned changes as their primary goal is to secure protection for investors from their jurisdiction. However, they should take three factors into consideration in contemplating the proposed changes. First, there has been significant pressure from various interest groups to strengthen the host State's power to regulate and punish international investors' (usually TNCs') violation of human rights. 149 Making the proposed changes in BITs might help the government confront pressure from interest groups. Second, recently, more States which were once capital-exporting countries have started to import capital, as well. The US is a typical example which has amended her model BIT several times to make it more balanced. Third, if the BITs continue to be unbalanced, it might cause certain States to withdraw from the ICSID system, 150 which might challenge the legitimacy of the system and even cause its collapse. Moreover, certain research indicates that structural biases exist in investor-State arbitrations. As a matter of fact, international arbitration is now regularly accused of lacking legitimacy, as well as being inherently biased in favor of investors and huge conglomerates. 151 Apparently, significant efforts are needed to reduce structural bias, so that the tribunal may be incentivized to give appropriate and sufficient consideration to host governments' human rights concerns.
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VI. Conclusion
BITs, as a main component of international investment law regulating international investment activities, need a reform. While the new BITs should be drafted (and existing ones be amended), the dispute settlement procedure should be also reformed to make TNCs more accountable for human rights violations. Regulation of TNCs is becoming a global public good, to which each player in the global society should contribute in accordance with its ability, join forces and pool resources to hold TNCs more accountable for their human rights violations. Concerted efforts are required. Moreover, various proposals have been made in regard to reforming international institutions to better address TNCs' violation of human rights. Among these proposed reforms, integrating changes in the substantive and procedural aspects of BITs might constitute an effective and meaningful response. 
